




U.S. Department of Justice

United States Marshals Service

District of Nevada

Las Vegas, NV 89101

October 16, 2007



Judge Dan L. Papez
7th Judicial District Court
P.O. Box 151629
Ely, NV 89315

Subject: Facility Survey of the White Pine County Courthouse, Ely, Nevada

Honorable Dan L. Papez:

Enclosed you will find the facility survey requested by your office. The survey's goal is to provide recommendations to improve overall security at the White Pine County Courthouse. The U.S. Marshals Service performs the survey as a courtesy at the request of state, local and municipal court facilities. The recommendations are not binding and are provided for the sole benefit of your organization.

We hope the information is beneficial and that this serves as a tool to augment the security to the court family at the White Pine County Courthouse. If we can be of further assistance or if you have recommendations that will assist us in improving the survey, your input would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Fidencio Rivera
Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal

FACILITY SURVEY



Name of Facility: WHITE PINE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

Location: 801 Clark Street
Ely, NV 89301-1994

Date of Survey: September 13, 2007

Survey Conducted By: Vincent Freiburger
Senior Inspector
Judicial Security Program
District of Nevada – Las Vegas Office

INTRODUCTION

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the United States Marshals Service and the General Services Administration, entered into an agreement to identify certain security systems to be utilized in all Federal Courthouses. The federal standards are published in a document known as the "Court Design Guide" which contains detailed guidelines for the Court Security System.

Upon request, the Court Security Program of the United States Marshals Service will perform a Court Security Survey of courthouse facilities for state, county and city officials utilizing the court design guide as a reference.

The survey focus is on the current methods used to provide protection for the judiciary and court support personnel as well as the general public who have access to a facility. Security enhancements are often inconvenient to the personnel affected by the changes. The main goal is to establish sound security measures and encourage personnel to accept the new changes by emphasizing how their overall safety can be increased with a minimum of inconvenience. Sound security measures enhance the success of the judicial process.

Please note it is not the intention of the United States Marshals Service to appear we are attempting to impose or dictate new courthouse security policies by conducting a survey. Our role is to respond to any request for assistance from law enforcement organizations charged with the responsibility of providing security to members of the judiciary and offer recommendations or guidelines which may improve their current courthouse security.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a request made by District Judge Dan L. Papez, Seventh Judicial District Court, the Judicial Security Inspector for the United States Marshals Service conducted a survey of the White Pine County Courthouse in Ely, Nevada on September 13, 2007.

The survey covered operational matters relating to court activities, security for both the judiciary and prisoners, the physical security of the building, including ingress and egress routes, interior physical controls such as keys, locks, alarms and emergency power.

The survey is centered on security procedures and countermeasures that can enhance those areas where significant emphasis should be placed. Some areas are more easily identifiable than others.

Physical security requirements usually are very difficult to measure in the sense of actual value. They have a place in the overall program and should be considered equally when authorizing appropriations.

System recommendations are more expensive initially to install, but they provide security personnel the ability to control access to a broader area while gaining efficiencies from a much smaller labor pool while increasing reliability and consistency of services. When considering any of the recommendations, one should weigh the advantages of the application. To install an entry control system for a judge's chambers, which is designed to eliminate unauthorized access, the primary concern is not to evaluate whether or not the judges will use the system; the primary consideration is that it will protect the integrity of the judicial process.

Additionally, duress alarms used to summon emergency law enforcement officers should be installed at each location where there is a need for emergency response. Screening stations, courtrooms, judge's chambers, prisoner areas and other areas where risk levels are defined, should have an alarm installed. Also each location where money is handled is also an area to consider using a duress alarm.

Duress alarms have other applications beside security concerns. They can be used for summoning law enforcement personnel where someone has become ill or injured during a mishap.

The installation of bullet resistant material at the main screening stations or behind a judge's bench is expensive, but this simple enhancement may preserve the life of a marshal/court bailiff and the judges they are charged to protect.

Planning and training is essential in the implementation of any program. How to use the equipment and expectation when it is used is an integral part of the consideration. Testing of alarms, emergency lights and routine monitoring should be done regularly. This is the element that is weak in most security programs.

REPORT

White Pine County Courthouse Ely, NV 89301

The White Pine County Courthouse is located at 801 Clark Street and opened in 1906. This 14,800 square foot two story structure is constructed of brick with a cement foundation, a number of solid masonry walls and double pane glass windows. The facility is occupied by several county agencies with a combined total of approximately 27 employees and has three courtrooms currently in use for civil and criminal matters.

NOTE: Asbestos may be a matter of serious concern based upon the age factor of this facility. I recommend an asbestos study before this facility undergoes any additional modifications.

The White Pine County Courthouse is situated within a residential area to include a middle school and public library. The complex borders the 800 block of Clark Street on the North; the County Library and the 500 block of 10th Street on the East; the 800 block of Campton Street on the South and residential area to the 500 block of 7th Street on the West.

***NOTE:** I must state for the record that this facility should no longer be used for any courthouse related matters either civil or criminal; in close proximity are residences, a middle school and county library. It is my understanding that Ely maximum security state prison inmates use this facility for most of their criminal and civil matters; should a serious security breach occur the close proximity could endanger residents and many of the middle school children in the immediate area. It will also hamper responding law enforcement agencies since they will have to address the resident and children safety issues in addition to any security breach that occurs.*

Not only is the site location unacceptable, but the facility will never meet minimum security standards based upon design and infrastructure issues. The structure itself is 101 years old and was not designed for the 21st century criminal element that appear before our judges today; the criminals who pass through our systems are far more sophisticated and violent than they were 50 to 100 years past. The infrastructure is seriously outdated and will most likely not support a small fraction of the security enhancements which would be necessary. Due to solid masonry walls and a possible asbestos issue electrical and plumbing lines are presently exposed throughout the facility, leaving them open to attack or sabotage.

The security integrity of our judicial system is paramount in achieving justice for everyone who enters any courtroom and the above matters alone makes further use of this facility impractical and places our judiciary, employees, citizens and prisoners in harms way.

My sincere professional recommendation is to find an alternative location and build another courthouse to meet the needs of everyone which will provide the security integrity to all who enter a White Pine County Courthouse.

Having said the above I will proceed with the recommendations to improve security at the current White Pine County Courthouse. Once you see the recommendations I believe it will prove that this old but historical courthouse will not be able to handle the security upgrades necessary for a 21st century courthouse.

EXTERIOR:

Problem: This facility has no secured parking for the judiciary, forcing them to park their vehicles in the open on public streets; vehicles can be easily sabotaged to intimidate, harass or harm judicial members.

Recommendation: With enough open space in the immediate area I recommend a covered and enclosed parking area for the judiciary and other court family personnel. This space should be camera monitored with an ingress/egress vehicle control package. A wall mounted duress alarm should also be placed within the parking area to provide an immediate response.

Problem: The exterior lighting is minimal, there is no exterior camera coverage, the courthouse windows lack proper tinting to prevent viewing directly into the offices, the shrubbery is not trimmed properly and the wells leading to the basement windows are not properly secured or monitored.


Recommendation: Additional lighting is necessary to properly illuminate 360 degrees around the courthouse with emphasis on all access points, all basement well areas, the grounds within a short distance of the courthouse and the walkways.

Monitored perimeter PTZ high resolution color cameras need to be placed around the courthouse to allow 360 degree coverage of the facility. (PTZ: Pan-Tilt-Zoom).

Window tinting or solar screens are necessary to prevent direct line of site into office windows during the day. Please understand these offer no protection at night, so all offices should keep their interior blinds at an oblique angle at all times.

Shrubbery can easily shield someone so the shrubbery pictured should be trimmed so it is 12" to 18" below the bottom of the window frame. In the 3rd picture shrubbery works to your advantage by blocking the view into the windows without shielding someone at ground level, just make sure the ground level growth remains trimmed at all times.


The basement window wells around this facility are wide open and can easily conceal an intruder. This area should be enclosed and access by hard key or card key ingress only and a push-bar egress for emergency exit. Any intruder will most likely access this area first so this area must be monitored closely through video and proper lighting.




Shrubbery covering 1st floor windows



Shrubbery allows concealment at windows




This shrubbery works to your advantage



Basement window wells surround the facility

Problem: As you can see in the photos below there is no buffer zone between the facility and Campton Street and cars are allowed to park within close proximity of the courthouse.

Recommendation: This section of Campton Street should be blocked off to prevent normal traffic and parking near the courthouse; the area to the left has an open area which could be converted for additional parking and the wall pictured could be reinforced as a blast wall to protect from anyone parking a car in the lot with lethal intentions.



Campton Street South of Courthouse




Vehicles parked to close to Courthouse


Problem: The first photo shows an open area between the prisoner sally port area and an office window; this area should be sealed to prevent public access and bollards installed to prevent a vehicle from accidentally crashing through the chain link fence and entering the office area.

The other photos show the prisoner sally port which fails to meet minimum security standards. This sally port has no foundation, consists of standard chain link fencing with pad locks and the overhead area is exposed. The exterior prisoner movement area is easily compromised and has no camera coverage or duress alarm in place.


Recommendation: This prisoner sally port should be replaced with a proper and secure facility for prisoner movements. A cement foundation enclosed with secure walls and roof with remote access for the prisoner vehicle rollup gate. The enclosure should also allow direct access to the prisoner ingress/egress courthouse door pictured below. This secure area should have a wall mounted duress alarm and be monitored via a video link. Both the prisoner vehicle roll-up gate and prisoner courthouse door need to be electronically activated from a remote location; transporting officers should never possess keys to either of these doors. An entry control package will be necessary for the monitoring station to have visual and oral communication with those who wish to enter the prisoner sally port area.




Gap between prisoner sally port & office



Prisoner sally port located on Campton St.




Standard pad lock and no covering




St. pad lock & area not properly secured

Problem: Open access to the areas pictured below. The gap between the stairs and prisoner sally port is wide enough for personnel to move through allowing access to prisoners and the basement door. The lower roof top leads directly to a judicial chamber window.

Recommendation: This area should be secured and monitored as well to include the grey utility cabinet. Public should not have access to this area and camera monitoring should be dedicated to the small roof top and the exterior basement and 2nd floor doors. The door pictured in the bottom left photo should be encased as part of the prisoner sally port area




Stairs and lower rooftop lead directly to Judicial chambers window



Stairs allow access to lower roof and anyone has access to the below pictured area





Rear courthouse door prisoners use and stairs



leading to basement area

As I explained on page 4, pictured below are the areas of concern since the courthouse floor plan is unsuitable which I will cover in the Interior section of the survey. Even with modest security improvements this facility is not suited for maximum security prisoners. As you can see any major security breach that moves to the exterior of the courthouse will be a direct and immediate threat to the women and children who primarily use this area.



INTERIOR:

The White Pine County Courthouse is open 8:00 am to 5:00 pm Monday thru Friday and some Saturdays. Two District Court Judges are located on the second floor and one Justice Court Judge is located in the basement level. The facility is occupied by approximately 27 employees daily from several county offices; at times 70 jurors plus another 30 consisting of plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses are also present, not to include daily visitors on routine county business.

There is no building alarm system and no building sprinkler system in place which puts all sensitive court/county records and evidence in jeopardy.

ACCESS POINTS: PUBLIC & EMPLOYEE ENTRANCE

The public entrance is located on the north side of the building and has no screening equipment in place on this level. A security screening station consisting of one magnetometer is located on the 2nd level only. The entrance itself is composed of one set of double doors. Employees are allowed to use the front or either door on the south or west sides of the courthouse. The west door is also used for visitors falling under the ADA (American with Disabilities Act).

Note: The screening access point is your *first line of defense*; if you do nothing else this is one area that needs to be addressed.

Problem: The entrance offers no protection for this facility or its employees and visitors, nor is it large enough to install security screening devices. Employees are not screened nor is there space to install security screening equipment at the west or south entrances. Also the west entrance does not meet ADA statute requirements.


Recommendation: The front entrance needs be expanded north and widened with a vestibule to accommodate a security screening station and modified to meet ADA statute requirements. Two sets of double doors are necessary, one for ingress and one for egress and another entrance door that meets ADA requirements. Bullet resistant glass panels should be installed to incase the front and side areas of the screening station. The screening station should consist of two magnetometers and at least 1 *Cat Scan machine. The screening station manpower should be no less than two security personnel for light volume and three personnel for high volume times. This allows at least one security officer to observe those approaching and those waiting to be screened while the other two concentrate on properly screening all who enter.

To enhance facility security, a duress alarm and monitor should be located at the screening station to monitor the immediate area outside the vestibule area; which provides timely warning to your first line defenders.


The voter registration office is on the first level and it is my understanding that under Nevada state law no security screening equipment is allowed to interfere with citizens seeking access to the voter registration office. If so, I strongly recommend the voter registration office be relocated or it will diminish the security integrity necessary for all courthouse personnel.

All visitors and employees entering should be fully screened when entering the courthouse. Although inconvenient, it does add another layer of security for each employee. EX: If someone with hostile intent sees an employee not being screened upon entry, they will use bribery or duress to get the employee to bring unlawful items into the courthouse. If however all employees are screened they will look for another avenue and most likely leave the employee and their family members alone.

* I just finished a 90 day evaluation of a Cat Scan screening machine vs. the x-ray unit we use to screen all packages, purse's etc that are brought into the courthouse. The Cat Scan unit is by far the best for security screening. Unlike the x-ray unit which provides a one dimensional view of the article, the Cat Scan provides a 3-dimensional view which rotates 360 degrees for optimal examination and highlights suspicious items. The Cat Scan is also programmed with the atomic numbers for all liquid and solid explosives which are used to exam all packages. We can get items through the x-ray unit because of its weaknesses, but we could not get anything through the Cat Scan unit without it being detected, to included knives, guns and various liquid and solid explosives.



North main entrance



West entrance for employees and ADA personnel

ACCESS POINTS: JUDGES ENTRANCE


The three judges can use the south, west and north entrance for access to the courthouse.

Problem: This area is wide open to the public with no camera coverage and the lighting is below minimum standards for security access points.

Recommendation: The south 2nd floor entrance or west 1st floor entrance should be for judges only and the door they use should be based upon the close proximity of their assigned parking spaces. The judges' entrance should have proper lighting and monitored digital recorded camera coverage.

If the south stairs become the judicial access point this area should be properly secured and monitored with siding along the south railing.

I would recommend when you build a proper prisoner sally port to also encase the stair area to provide judges extra security as they ascend/descend the rear of the building.



ACCESS CARDS/KEYS:

The facility has no electronic card keys on site; the hard keys are maintained on a master roster by the building maintenance supervisor.

Problem: There is no policy in place to change out the hard key locks periodically; the last time the locks were changed was in 1986.

Recommendation: The court administrator should implement a policy to change all hard key locks every 3 to 5 years. I also recommend all building access doors be equipped with MedCo or equivalent type security locks. These locks should also be used on office doors which house over night cash funds and evidence/property offices. These locks cannot be bumped or picked and offer a high degree of security.

COURTROOMS:

Two District courtrooms are located on the second level and the Justice courtroom is located in the basement. There is one duress alarm located at the judges' bench, but here are no other security measures in place. The District and Justice courtrooms allow all law enforcement personnel to enter the courtroom armed. All three courtroom lights are manually activated via standard light switches and no cameras are present.

Problem: Allowing all law enforcement personnel to enter the court room armed escalates the chance of a friendly fire scenario should a weapon be drawn by someone other than known Bailiff personnel.

The interior courtroom light switches are accessible and can be easily turned off to create havoc during courtroom proceedings. No security cameras present, no ballistic material is encased in the

judge's bench, windows provide an open view into the courtroom and electrical and plumbing lines are exposed on the outside of the walls.

Recommendation: Except for Bailiff personnel, no other law enforcement officers should be allowed to enter a courtroom armed. This allows courtroom Bailiffs to react to a gun incident without hesitation when they know they are the only ones allowed armed in the courtroom. A modified policy for armed uniformed officers could be considered.

I recommend a law enforcement gun locker room be installed at the front entrance for all visiting officers appearing in court.

All Bailiff Personnel handling prisoners within the well area should be armed with non-lethal weapons only. All armed Bailiff personnel should be located outside the well area to provide them time & distance for a safer armed response.

The courtroom lighting should be key-controlled to prevent anyone one from manually darkening the courtroom. All exposed electrical and plumbing lines need to be encased in the courtrooms and throughout the courthouse. Exposed plumbing and electrical lines make it to easy to tap into or sabotage for diversionary purposes.

Recommend at least one to two security cameras be installed to allow monitoring of the defendant and gallery areas and one additional duress alarm be added at the courtroom administration desk. Duress alarms should be tested quarterly.


The judicial bench should be lined with ballistic material and there should be two doors allowing emergency egress for the judge. The jury box should be moved further down from the bench and witness stand; the current close proximity does not bode well for courtroom security. The well swing gates should only open towards the bench; if a defendant tries to run they will have to stop and pull the swing gate back to pass through; this momentary hesitation should give court officers an opportunity to react. Courtroom doors should be solid core doors with little or no glass since glass does not mute sounds very well.

Courtroom windows should have protective coatings or solar screens to prevent direct line of sight into the courtroom. Interior blinds must be kept at an oblique angle since coatings and solar screens have no effect after dark.


The prisoner seating location is very antiquated and is not suitable for state maximum security prisoners. This area should be encased since it is positioned so close to the gallery and except for trials all prisoners should remain in full restraints.




District court



Prisoner seating area



Light switches should be key controlled



Plumbing & Electrical lines should be encased

CHAMBERS:

The three judge's chambers have unattached duress alarms, but no emergency lighting. The chamber windows have internal window coverings but the window coverings were not properly used. No entry control package was in place for any of the judge's chambers.

Problem: All judicial chamber windows lacked protective coatings; the windows did have blinds which were not properly used and allowed a clear view into the chamber areas. Chamber door is hollow with a standard locking mechanism. No emergency lighting is in place and the small confines make an entry control package impractical

Recommendation: Mylar and window tinting should be applied to chamber windows and window coverings should be kept at an oblique angle to offer obstructed viewing from the outside.
NOTE: Mylar is available with a reflective coating. Each chamber should have emergency lighting

capabilities in place the duress alarm should be permanently attached to the desk. Solid core doors with MedCo type locks should be used for all chamber doors. Each chamber door should be camera monitored with a feed to the monitoring station and to a monitor in the judicial chambers, allowing the judge to identify anyone seeking access before the door is opened. This is most important since the design and confines of this facility allows the general public open access.

NOTE: Judicial Profiles are not maintained for any judge. These profiles save time and lives if an immediate and viable threat places a judge and family members in peril. The profiles are completed and updated annually and kept in a secure location by Bailiff Supervisory Personnel.

See attached copy of USM-50 which can be modified for White Pine County use

COMMON AREA:


Problem: The common areas pictured below are used by everyone appearing in court. This small area must accommodate jurors, witnesses, attorneys, defendants and their family and friends; prisoners are also escorted past this same area.

The men's room is just down the hall and it is also used by all the above in addition to all prisoners and the judges.

The windows in this area have no coverings and allow direct viewing from the exterior.

Recommendation: If a new facility is not an option I would recommend moving some county offices out of the courthouse so a jury lounge and a public waiting area could be built. I also recommend that restroom facilities be built so the judges and court family personnel are not sharing with the public. The jury lounge should also have it own restrooms so jurors can maintain their distance from the public. The security integrity of our jury system is based on jurors having little or no contact with trial personnel before and during proceedings, which in this case cannot be met and falls below minimum security standards.

The windows should have an exterior coating and the interior should also have coverings to prevent direct line of sight in to the waiting area.



PRISONERS:


The prisoners use the public elevator in the rear of the courthouse for access to the second level and are housed in a make shift holding area. Each cell can handle one prisoner or two very small prisoners and there are no toilets, sink, or drinking water available. To use the restroom prisoners are escorted to the public area and use the only single men's room available.

Problem: This facility is not designed or adequately equipped to handle state high security prisoners. Manpower used to handle prisoners in this setting is below minimum standards and poses a direct threat to all court family personnel and visitors.

The building directory is posted in the rear of the building where prisoners wait for the public elevator; this provides them information to the building layout and tenant information. The pipes and electrical lines are a continuing issue throughout the facility.

Recommendation: A major re-model to include prisoner holding cells with proper facilities in place and which also allows direct access into the courtroom without traveling through a public area. A duress alarm should also be installed for law enforcement personnel in the prisoner holding area.

The building directory should be located towards the front of the facility, away from prisoner viewing and the pipes and electrical lines covered to prevent damage by prisoners.




Prisoner holding area

Building directory and more exposed pipes

2nd FLOOR: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE:

Problem: The DA's Office is open to the public with only one duress alarm in place. There is no emergency lighting and no access control measures in place. This office can handle up to \$2,000 and is kept in a hand carried lock box.

Recommendation: The office door should be a solid core door equipped with a MedCo type lock. The wall pictured with the calendar should be converted to a secure counter top with bullet resistance material and glass. Emergency lighting should be in place and two additional duress alarms installed at the DA and secretary desks. A floor mounted safe should be used to store all monetary items.



2nd FLOOR: JURY ROOM:

Problem: The jury room is small and confined and the windows allow open viewing into and out of the jury room; there is no emergency lighting in place.

Recommendation: The windows allow for distractions and communication both ways which could defeat the security integrity for a trial. The windows should be frosted to prevent jurors from being distracted and external coverings to obstruct viewing from the outside. Emergency lighting should be installed.


1st FLOOR: AUDITOR/RECORDERS OFFICE.

Problem: There are no security measures in place.

Recommendation: The Recorder's entrance door should be replaced with a solid core door and MedCo type lock to prevent easy entry after hours. The counter area should be re-enforced with ballistic material and glass to ensure the safety of county personnel. Additional duress alarms and emergency lighting is also warranted.

The vault used to store county funds should also have a monitored entry camera and emergency lighting.

The Finance doors should be equipped with an entry control package and not propped open for public access. Duress alarms and emergency lighting should also be installed.



County Records Office

County Auditors/Finance Office

1st FLOOR COUNTY CLERK/VOTER REGISTRATION/DISTRICT COURT CLERK:

Problem: There are no security measures in place.

Recommendation: The counter area like all the rest should be enclosed to prevent unauthorized public access into employee personal work space. The counter should be reinforced with BR glass and duress alarms installed. Emergency lighting in the office and records area is also necessary and window coverings for both the interior and exterior also apply.



County Clerks Office

Clerk's Office Records

Area


1st FLOOR DISTRICT ATTORNEY PROPERTY/EVIDENCE ROOM:

Problem: The DA uses this office space to store items, including firearms, until legal matters have been finalized. There are no security measures in place.

Recommendation: The doors should be reinforced with solid core doors and MedCo type locks and the entry door camera monitored. The door should be alarmed and a duress alarm installed in case of forced entry. The windows should also be alarmed and the exterior protected with high grade security screening to prevent easy access. Each entry should be documented to preserve the security integrity of all stored items.



District Attorney's Property/Evidence



Storage area

1st FLOOR TREASURERS OFFICE:

Problem: There are no security measures in place. Like the other first floor offices, this office is easily accessible from the exterior.

Recommendation: The counter should be incased to keep the public out of personal work space by reinforcing the counter to include BR glass on the counter top. Duress alarms at the counter and desks and emergency lighting are all necessary. Funds are kept in the vault but the vault has no emergency lighting. The windows like the others need exterior and interior protection.


EMPLOYEES:

Recommendation: All employees should continue to have a NCIC & local criminal computer inquiry completed prior to starting their employment. This would be followed with a mandated FBI fingerprint examination requirement as a condition for continued employment. Also recommend every employee receive a computer criminal inquiry every 5 to 7 years.

1st FLOOR UNSECURED AREAS:


Problem: These areas are unsecured and are located in public space.

Recommendation: Secure all these areas with reinforced cabinets and proper security locks. All the exposed plumbing and electrical wiring throughout the facility is an issue onto itself, but unsecured items like these can be addressed immediately.



Public 1st Floor Area

Telephone and Electrical Closet



Custodian Closet

Duress Alarm Panel


BASEMENT JUSTICE COURT AND LAW LIBRARY:

Problem: There are no security measures in place and the close confines of this courtroom make it unsafe for judicial personnel.

Recommendation: I cannot in good conscious recommend the use of this space as a courtroom/chambers area. However, if it is to be so then duress alarms and emergency lighting are required in both the courtroom and chamber and an additional camera installed to cover the defendant and gallery area. The window wells are still a major concern and should be sealed with high grade security screening with security locks. The doors should be solid core with high grade locks.

The Justice Court Clerks Office counter glass should be replaced with BR glass with proper door and lock; this area like the first floor allows unscreened visitors open access to the area.

The law library is unsecured during the day and needs a duress alarm and emergency lighting; the law library should be restricted to court family personnel and certified state bar attorneys only.



EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT & EVACUATION PLANS:

The fire equipment is properly located and is checked monthly; no sprinkler system present but each level is equipped with a fire hose.

Problem: The facility has no evacuation chair for the 2nd floor and no Automated External Defibrillators (AED) on site. There is no formal evacuation/hostage/bomb threat plans and drills are not conducted. This facility has no judicial protection plan in place should any judge receive a viable threat warranting immediate protection.

Recommendation: This facility should have at least one evacuation chair for the second level and two AED units on site. The Evac/hostage/bomb plans should be formulated and distributed to all employees with an annual 1 hour security awareness class mandated for all employees. There also should be a semi-annual, but no less than an annual evacuation drill for ALL employees and/or tenants.


A basic judicial protection plan should be in place that outlines portal to portal protection, two person security escort detail and a 24/7 protection detail should the need arise.

NOTE: At least once a year the judges and their family members should be invited to attend a security awareness training class. Most classes take about one hour and provide them information about office, home, vehicle and travel security measures to be aware of.

This same program can be tailored for building employees and this should be a yearly requirement for all employees. This training really enhances employee security awareness which only adds to the security integrity of your facility.

MISC - ROOF ACCESS:

Recommendation: The roof access is neither alarmed nor video monitored, also this facility has an oversized attic/crawl space area. I recommend a monitored video feed for the top of the roof and the access point pictured below. Because the attic/crawl space are is so vast I recommend motion sensors cover this area and the roof top door alarmed to alert security personnel.



BUILDING PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM:

Recommendation: I recommend the installation of a facility PA system. This system can expedite emergency notifications such as “Shelter in Place”, “Active Shooter” or any other emergency announcements where time is a critical factor.

COURTHOUSE CONTROLROOM:

Recommendation: Serious consideration should be given to having a dedicated courthouse security control room. This will provide the courthouse a higher degree of security awareness and response.

Manpower for a control room for a facility of this size should be a minimum of two personnel at all times.



Judicial Personnel Profile

Name:

Purpose

Profile information from USMS protectees is collected, stored securely, and utilized by United States Marshals Personnel in the event of an emergency response. All requested information is essential in forming a strategy for emergency or tactical response, if there is ever a need.

Authority

28 USC 561(g) and 28 CFR 0.111. Specifically, 28 USC 566 (e)(1)(A) establishes the U.S. Marshals Service's authority to provide personal protection to federal jurists, court officers, witnesses, and other threatened persons in the interests of justice where criminal intimidation impedes the judicial process or any other official proceeding.

Notice of Privacy

The Judicial Personnel Profile is considered "Sensitive -- Limited Official Use" and must be stored in an approved security container, such as a safe. These folders will be accessible only by district senior management and the District Judicial Security Inspector. The information contained herein will be entered in a secure database limiting access to only those in the USMS with a need to know.

Judicial Personnel Profile

Full Name:

Nickname:

Title:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Home Address:

Number of people residing at home: _____

Office Address:

Home Phone:

Office Phone:

Cellular Phone:

E-mail / Other:

Regular Work Hours:

Days:

Weekend work at office: Yes No

Physical Description:

Eyes: _____ Height: _____ Weight: _____
Hair: _____ Glasses: _____

Additional Identifiers:

Comments:

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Page ___ of ___

Judicial Personnel Profile (cont.)

Person to notify in an emergency:

Address/phone:

Medical conditions/Allergic to:

Medication Required/Intervals:

Blood Type:

Doctor(s): Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Languages Spoken:

Regularly Scheduled Events/Locations for Protective Response in case of emergency):

Please provide a list and description of firearms and/or weapons you currently own, and their location (home or office): *(In case of a tactical response, this information will be used.)*

1. _____ 3. _____
2. _____ 4. _____

Miscellaneous Information:

Date Completed / Updated :

Vehicle #1

Primary Driver:

Make:

Model:

Year:

Color:

License Plate Number/State:

Vehicle #2

Primary Driver:

Make:

Model:

Year:

Color:

License Plate Number/State:

Vehicle #3

Primary Driver:

Make:

Model:

Year:

Color:

License Plate Number/State:

Vehicle #3

Primary Driver:

Make:

Model:

Year:

Color:

License Plate Number/State:

Date Completed / Updated :

(Please mark inapplicable items as such.)

Full Name:

Nickname/other names used:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Home Address (if different from judge's):

Business Address:

Occupation:

Home Phone (if different from judge's):

Office Phone:

Cellular Phone:

E-mail / Other:

Regular Work Hours:

Days:

Physical Description:

Height: _____

Weight: _____

Eyes: _____

Hair: _____

Glasses: _____

Additional Identifiers:

Comments:

Date Completed / Updated :

Person to notify in an emergency:

Address/phone:

Medical conditions/Allergic to:

Medication Required/Intervals:

Blood Type:

Doctor(s): Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Languages Spoken:

Regularly Scheduled Events/Locations for Protective Response in case of emergency):

Please provide a list and description of firearms and/or weapons you currently own, and their location (home or office): *(In case of a tactical response, this information will be used.)*

1. _____ 3. _____
2. _____ 4. _____

Miscellaneous Information:

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Page ___ of ___

Forms for additional dependents or members of household: [click here](#)

(Please mark inapplicable items as such.)

Full Name:

Other names used:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Home Address:

Workplace, School or Day Care Name and Address:

Workplace, School or Day Care Phone:

Home Phone:

Office Phone:

Cellular Phone:

E-mail / Other:

Hours and Days of Attendance:

Physical Description:

Height: _____

Weight: _____

Eyes: _____

Hair: _____

Glasses: _____

Additional Identifiers:

Comments:

Date Completed / Updated :

Person to notify in an emergency:

Address/phone:

Medical conditions *(in the event there is an emergency)*:

Medication Required/Intervals:

Blood Type:

Allergic To:

Doctor(s) Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Regularly Scheduled Events/Locations:

Married: Yes

No

Name of Spouse:

Children:

Comments:

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Page ___ of ___

Forms for additional dependents or members of household: [click here](#)

(Please mark inapplicable items as such.)

Full Name: _____

Other names used: _____

Date of Birth: _____

Place of Birth: _____

Home Address: _____

Workplace, School or Day Care Name and Address: _____

Workplace, School or Day Care Phone: _____

Home Phone: _____

Office Phone: _____

Cellular Phone: _____

E-mail / Other: _____

Hours and Days of Attendance: _____

Physical Description:

Height: _____

Weight: _____

Eyes: _____

Hair: _____

Glasses: _____

Additional Identifiers: _____

Comments: _____

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Person to notify in an emergency:

Address/phone:

Medical conditions (in the event there is an emergency):

Medication Required/Intervals:

Blood Type:

Allergic To:

Doctor(s): Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Name:

Specialization:

Address:

Phone:

Regularly Scheduled Events/Locations:

Married: Yes

No

Name of Spouse:

Children:

Comments:

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Page ___ of ___

Full Name: _____

Address: _____

Phone: _____

Type of building:

- Single family home
- Townhouse/Duplex
- Multi-family home
- Apartments
- Other

Type of neighborhood:

- Urban
- Suburban - hi pop.
- Suburban - secluded
- Rural/Farm
- Resort/Vacation
- Other

Number of floors in dwelling: _____

Garage door opener? Yes No

Lowest floor of dwelling: _____

Access to dwelling from basement? Yes No

Highest floor of dwelling: _____

Access to dwelling from roof? Yes No

Number of entrances to residence: _____

Number of skylights: _____

Number of doors to public corridors: _____

Type of alarm system: _____

	<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>
Is it fully operational?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it secure all entries to the dwelling?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it have back-up for power failure?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it detect smoke?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it detect heat?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it alert the fire department?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Window bars and doors? _____

Type of door locks and dead bolt? _____

Miscellaneous home-related information: _____

Names and addresses of two closest neighbors: _____

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Note: Below, please draw (or photocopy) diagrams of each floor of your dwelling. Be careful to note all doors and windows, including garage doors and any other points of entry. (USMS may assist.)

Floorplan for ground level:

Floorplan for lowest level:

Floorplan for highest level:

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access

Residential Information/Floorplans

Full Name: _____

Address: _____

Phone: _____

Type of building:

- Single family home
- Townhouse/Duplex
- Multi-family home
- Apartments
- Other

Type of neighborhood:

- Urban
- Suburban - hi pop.
- Suburban - secluded
- Rural/Farm
- Resort/Vacation
- Other

Number of floors in dwelling: _____

Garage door opener? Yes No

Lowest floor of dwelling: _____

Access to dwelling from basement? Yes No

Highest floor of dwelling: _____

Access to dwelling from roof? Yes No

Number of entrances to residence: _____

Number of skylights: _____

Number of doors to public corridors: _____

Type of alarm system: _____

	<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>
Is it fully operational?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it secure all entries to the dwelling?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it have back-up for power failure?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it detect smoke?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it detect heat?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Does it alert the fire department?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Window bars and doors? _____

Type of door locks and dead bolt? _____

Miscellaneous home-related information: _____

Names and addresses of two closest neighbors: _____

Date Completed / Updated :

Confidential Information - Restricted Access